With battle lines clearly drawn in the US, Jonathan Haidt explains what, deep down, separates the Democrats from the Republicans:

…the second rule of moral psychology is that morality is not just about how we treat each other (as most liberals think); it is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way.

When Republicans say that Democrats “just don’t get it,” this is the “it” to which they refer. Conservative positions on gays, guns, god, and immigration must be understood as means to achieve one kind of morally ordered society. When Democrats try to explain away these positions using pop psychology they err, they alienate, and they earn the label “elitist.” But how can Democrats learn to see—let alone respect—a moral order they regard as narrow-minded, racist, and dumb?

Do read the full article. In the comments section, Scott Atran is particularly interesting. [via 3QD]

Haidt’s compelling thesis—which I read last year, after watching his brilliant lecture at the Beyond Belief conference—appears in this paper, which carries the following abstract:

Abstract: Researchers in moral psychology and social justice have agreed that morality is about matters of harm, rights, and justice. On this definition of morality, conservative opposition to social justice programs appears to be immoral, and has been explained as a product of various non-moral processes such as system justification or social dominance orientation. In this article we argue that, from an anthropological perspective, the moral domain is usually much broader, encompassing many more aspects of social life and valuing institutions as much or more than individuals. We present theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that there are five psychological systems that provide the foundations for the world’s many moralities. The five foundations are psychological preparations for detecting and reacting emotionally to issues related to harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Political liberals have moral intuitions primarily based upon the first two foundations, and therefore misunderstand the moral motivations of political conservatives, who generally rely upon all five foundations.

Haidt is able to explain not just the culture wars in the US but also the social preferences in other cultures, including those based on “Asian Values”. It is important for liberals to try and understand the conservative worldview on its own terms, if only to pick the right battles and to have greater success selling their own. The liberal-individualist worldview, Haidt also reminds us, is not without significant costs of its own.